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UNITED STATES V. GAUDIN:
A DECISION WITH MATERIAL IMPACT
Jeffrey Saks*
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Gaudin,1 the Supreme Court reviewed a case in
which a real estate broker and developer was convicted, among other
things, of defrauding the government by falsely filling out housing
loan forms,2 thereby violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001.3 The Court held that
materiality was an element of a prosecution for making false state-
ments to the government under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.1 The Court noted
that materiality, while not necessarily a purely factual element, was a
mixed question of law and fact.5 Thus, in order to comply with the
* My deepest thanks to Daniel C. Richman, Associate Professor, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law, for his endless assistance in the formation and development of
this Note. My thanks as well to Assistant United States Attorney Richard K. Hayes
and to my wife, Lori Riga, J.D., for their generous and insightful comments on earlier
drafts of this Note.
1. United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995).
2. Michael Gaudin was a real estate broker and developer from Montana. He
was convicted of one count of equity skimming for failing to pay loans insured by the
United States Housing & Urban Development/Federal Housing Administration, a vi-
olation of 12 U.S.C. § 1709-2. He also was convicted of 43 counts of violating 18
U.S.C. § 1001 for making false statements on the loan applications. Prosecutors said
Gaudin bought houses, then entered into fraudulent sales transactions with friends
and family members at inflated appraised prices before obtaining federal mortgages
on the basis of the inflated prices. He later repurchased the houses and rented them
while failing to make the mortgage payments. See United States v. Gaudin, 997 F.2d
1267, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd 28 F3d 943 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), aff'd 115 S.
Ct. 2310 (1995). The manner in which Gaudin filled out the HUD/FHA forms was
the key to the § 1001 convictions because the buyer, designated on the form as the
"borrower," was to indicate on line 303 of the form whether there was a balance due
to the borrower or owed by the borrower and for what amount. The form also had a
certification stating: "I have carefully reviewed the HUD-1 Settlement Statement and
to the best of my knowledge and belief it is a true and accurate statement of all re-
ceipts and disbursements made on my account or by me in this transaction." Gaudin,
28 F.3d at 944-45. Thus, because Gaudin, not the buyer, either paid or received the
cash balances, the government was able to prosecute him under § 1001 for having
made false statements. See Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2312-13; see also Gaudin, 28 F.3d at
944-45.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up
by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writ-
ing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudu-
lent statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (emphasis added).
4. See Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2314-15, 2320.
5. See id. at 2314.
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Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment6 and the right to a jury
trial granted by the Sixth Amendment,7 the Court held that the jury
must determine materiality. 8
6. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. Const. amend. V.
7. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
8. United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2314, 2319-20 (1995). Thus, because
the district court had deemed materiality a question of law, allowing it to be deter-
mined by the court, the Ninth Circuit was correct in reversing Gaudin's conviction.
See U.S. States v. Gaudin, 997 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 28 F.3d 943 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995).
The Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993), detailed the
jury right:
In Duncan v. Louisiana we found this right to trial by jury in serious criminal
cases to be "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and therefore
applicable in state proceedings. The right includes, of course, as its most
important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach
the requisite finding of "guilty." Thus, although a judge may direct a verdict
for the defendant if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he
may not direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the
evidence.
What the factfinder must determine to return a verdict of guilty is pre-
scribed by the Due Process Clause. The prosecution bears the burden of
proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the
factfinder "beyond a reasonable doubt" of the facts necessary to establish
each of those elements.
Id. at 2080 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)) (citations
omitted).
For a detailed discussion on the history of the Sixth Amendment, see Albert W.
Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 869-75 (1994); see also James B. Thayer, "Law and
Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 147, 147-50 (1890) [hereinafter Law and Fact]
(detailing the history of jury formation and the allotment of roles between the judge
and jury). According to Thayer, the maxim "ad quaestionem juris respondent judices,
ad quaestionem facti respondent juratores" ("matters of law are for the court and
matters of fact are for the jury") likely dates back to the 16th century. Id. at 148-49.
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At first glance, the Supreme Court's decision in Gaudin looks
rather simple. After all, it is not a very long opinion,9 especially by
Supreme Court standards.'" Furthermore, despite the divergent views
held by the individual justices," the Court voted 9-0 in Gaudin. Why
the Court even bothered granting certiorari may be questioned. 2
That Gaudin was one of last term's least-heralded decisions certainly
is no surprise.13
Nonetheless, despite its superficial innocuousness, Gaudin is a very
significant case. The opinion is important not only for the stance
taken by the Court, but for the questions the Court did not answer
and the implications the holding may have.
Gaudin reconciled the seemingly conflicting Supreme Court deci-
sions of In re Winship 4 and Sinclair v. United States.15 In Winship, the
Court held that the Constitution entitles a defendant to a jury deter-
mination, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the facts required to estab-
lish the elements of a crime.' 6 In Sinclair, however, the Court found
9. See Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2310. The entire opinion, including the syllabus,
headnotes, and a concurring opinion, is just less than 12 pages in the Supreme Court
reporter. The opinion of the court is approximately ei ght pages.
10. For example, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), is a per curiam opinion that
runs almost 150 pages in the U.S. Reports. The entire opinion, with an appendix and
concurrences by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Marshall, and Rehnquist,
concludes at 424 U.S. 294.
11. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Tug of War in the 1994-1995 Term: Can the Center
Hold?, Legal Tnes, July 31, 1995, at S23 (noting the Court's shift to the conservative
side in several significant 5-4 decisions, and depicting the Court as having three
staunchly conservative members, three staunch liberals, and three moderates that tip
the balance in close cases); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penn, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995) (overruling, by a 5-4 margin, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980),
bringing congressional power to enact affirmative action programs in line with the
states's power, under City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989));
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding, by a 5-4 margin, that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress' power to enact legislation
under the Commerce Clause).
12. See 115 S. Ct. 713 (1995). Of course, a clear circuit split on the issue may have
prompted the Court's grant of certiorari. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
13. For example, both Lopez and Adarand Constructors received extensive cover-
age by the New York Tunes, including front-page stories. See Linda Greenhouse, High
Court Kills Law Banning Guns in a School Zone, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al;
Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5 to 4, Cast Doubts on U.S. Programs That Give Prefer-
ences Based on Race, N.Y. Tunes, June 13,1995, at Al. The major story regarding the
Court the day of the Gaudin decision was the Court's holding in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995) (holding homo-
sexuals did not have a right to march in the annual Boston St. Patrick's Day parade).
See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Lets Parade in Boston Bar Homosexuals, N.Y.
Times, June 20,1995, at Al. By contrast, the Gaudin decision was not reported in the
New York Tunes.
14. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
15. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
16. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. The Supreme Court stated-
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reason-
able-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof [to a proper factfinder]
15] 1159
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materiality to be a legal issue in false statement prosecutions.17 The
government in Gaudin initially argued to the Supreme Court that ma-
teriality is a question of law, not a question of fact, and thus no con-
flict existed between the two cases.' 8 At oral argument, however, the
government's position was severely damaged when it conceded that
materiality was a mixed question of law and fact. 9 Ultimately, the
Court held that materiality, as a mixed question of law and fact, must
be determined by the jury. 0
The decision is noteworthy in several respects. As an initial matter,
the unanimous Court sided with the Ninth Circuit,2' overruling prece-
dent in every other circuit regarding how to treat materiality in a
§ 1001 prosecution.' While not much principle may have underlay
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.
Id.
17. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298-99.
18. In its brief, the government stated:
The holding of Winship has no direct application in this case; the question
presented here does not concern the degree of proof that the government
must meet with regard to a particular factual question in a criminal proceed-
ing. Instead, it concerns whether the issue of materiality is one of law for
decision by the court, or one of fact for decision by the jury.
Petitioner's Brief, United States v. Gaudin, No. 94-514, 1995 WL 71510, at *32 (U.S.
Feb. 21, 1995).
19. It didn't take long for the government to encounter problems. On the very
first question, Justice O'Connor asked: "[I]t would make sense to say it was a mixed
question of law and fact, wouldn't it?" The government conceded this point, greatly
impacting the Court's decision. See Oral Argument Transcript, United States v.
Gaudin, No. 94-514, 1995 WL 243457, at *4 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1995). As Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted in his concurring opinion: "But the Government's concessions have
made this case a much easier one than it might otherwise have been." United States v.
Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2320 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
20. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2314, 2319.
21. The Ninth Circuit initially reversed the trial court, holding materiality was for
the jury to decide. United States v. Gaudin, 997 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 28
F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995).
22. See 28 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). As
Judge Kozinski noted:
Every other circuit to have considered whether materiality under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 is a question of fact or a question of law-which means every circuit
except the Federal-has held that it's a question of law.
... What more can one possibly say except that the maverick spirit is alive
and well here in the West?
Id. As support, Judge Kozinski cited United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 1004 (10th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991); United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 31
n.3 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Brantley, 786 F.2d 1322, 1327 & n.2 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v. Chandler, 752 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (6th
Cir. 1985); Nilson Van & Storage Co. v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985);
United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States v. Elkin,
731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359, 1362 n.4
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Hausmann, 711 F.2d
615, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hicks, 619 F.2d 752, 758 (8th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Bernard, 384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967).
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the long-standing rule, the practice of judges determining materiality
issues in analogous situations dated back to nineteenth-century Eng-
land,' and was followed by nearly every court in the United States.7
Thus, the Court in Gaudin took a bold step by going against the
weight of authority. Despite its reversal of settled precedent, the
Court in Gaudin made the proper decision in enforcing the criminal
defendant's constitutionally protected right to a jury trial.
Perhaps more important, however, is what the Court left unan-
swered in its opinion. The Court's decision seemed simple: Because
materiality is an element of a § 1001 prosecution, and because materi-
ality is a mixed question of law and fact, the issue goes to the jury.8
Section 1001, however, is just one of numerous criminal false state-
ment statutes with a materiality requirement;27 the Gaudin opinion is
silent, however, on the breadth of its holding.?8
23. See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Regina v. Gibbon, 169 Eng. Rep. 1324, 1326 (1861) (holding that
materiality in a perjury case is for the court to decide); Regina v. Southwood, 175
Eng. Rep. 762, 762 (1858) (same); Regina v. Overton, 174 Eng. Rep. 676, 677 (1842)
(same); King v. Nicholl, 109 Eng. Rep. 695, 696 (1830) (reaching same result implic-
itly, with court making materiality determination); Rex v. Dunston, 171 Eng. Rep.
960, 961 (1824) (same as Nicholl).
25. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298-99 (1929) (citing Carroll v.
United States, 16 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1927); United States v. Singleton, 54 F. 488 (S.D.
Ala. 1892); Cothran v. State, 39 Miss. 541 (Miss. 1860)).
26. United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2314 (1995).
27. As Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit en banc panel noted in his dissent:
We have a substantial body of case law holding that materiality is a question
of law under a variety of statutes. Thus judges, not juries, decide the materi-
ality of false statements in tax returns. Ditto for false statements to grand
juries; for false statements in applications for payments in federally-ap-
proved plans for medical assistance; and for pejury. . . The disruption [of
adopting the majority's view] is greater still rve only mentioned five stat-
utes-ones where our circuit has already held who decides materiality. But
the majority's theory easily covers all statutes that contain a similar material-
ity requirement. How many other criminal statutes punish those who make
material false statements to a government agency? My research discloses
forty-three that have explicit materiality requirements and another fifty-four
where such a requirement is probably implied.
United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 957-60 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citations omit-
ted), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995); see also infra notes 73-103 and accompanying text.
28. Whether the holding applied to other statutes with materiality requirements
was not the only question left unanswered by the Court's opinion. In fact, another
unanswered question even raised a comment in Chief Justice Rehnquist's concur-
rence. Separate from the dispute as to whether materiality was an element to be
determined by the jury or a question of law to be determined by the judge, a dispute
also exists as to whether a materiality requirement is actually present in every prose-
cution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Every circuit except the Second Circuit holds that the
materiality requirement, which is expressly stated in the first of three clauses that
describe various acts proscribed by the statute, should be read into the remaining two.
Compare United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) ("'While material-
ity is not an explicit requirement of the second, false statements, clause of § 1001,
courts have inferred a judge-made limitation of materiality in order to exclude trifles
from its coverage."' (quoting United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th
1995] 1161
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Consequently, several questions remain. Is the holding limited to
materiality in a § 1001 offense, or does the jury requirement extend to
the bevy of false statement statutes with a materiality requirement?
Looking beyond materiality, what does Gaudin say about mixed ques-
tions of law and fact in general? One disturbing possibility is that a
legislature might react to Gaudin by drafting a false statement statute
in which it expressly labels the materiality element as a question of
law for the court to decide. Would a court be bound to defer to such a
legislative label, or should the court, relying on its own definition of a
mixed question of law and fact, strike down the statute as unconstitu-
tionally circumventing the jury requirement?
This Note attempts to answer the questions posed above. Part I will
provide an historical background to § 1001, detailing the settled prac-
tice of characterizing materiality in analogous contexts, such as per-
jury proceedings, as a question of law for the judge to decide. This
part argues that the Court's decision in Gaudin, which reversed the
settled practice, was constitutionally correct due to the importance of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to have a jury make all factual
determinations beyond a reasonable doubt.
Part II will then analyze the likely breadth of Gaudin. Part II as-
serts that Gaudin should be read as requiring not only that materiality
be determined by the jury in § 1001 prosecutions, but that the jury
also determine the question of materiality in all similar false statement
statutes.
Part III of this Note contends that in Gaudin the Court made clear
that all mixed questions of law and fact must go to the jury. There-
fore, this interpretation would preclude a legislature from attempting
to circumvent Gaudin's mandate by drafting a statute in which it ex-
plicitly defined materiality as a question of law for the court to decide.
Part III argues that courts should recognize that regardless of the leg-
islature's labelling, materiality is an inherently mixed question of law
and fact,29 and as such it must go to the jury. This Note concludes that
Gaudin requires that materiality in all false statement statutes must be
determined by a jury, as is the case for all mixed questions of law and
fact. A more narrow interpretation of Gaudin could vitiate a criminal
defendant's constitutional guarantee to have the jury determine fac-
Cir. 1980))) with United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It is
settled in this Circuit that materiality is not an element of the offense of making a
false statement in violation of § 1001."). The Court's opinion failed to address this
circuit split, leading Chief Justice Rehnquist to recognize the conflict: "The Court
does not resolve that conflict; rather, it merely assumes that materiality is, in fact, an
element of the false statement clause of § 1001." Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2320-21 (Rehn-
quist, C.J., concurring).
29. See discussion infra part III.A.
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tual elements and the protections provided by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.30
I. THE PRECEDENT TREATING MATERIALITY As
A QUESTION OF LAW
The Court's decision in Gaudin would not have been surprising
were it not so contrary to precedent. As this part details, in the con-
text of § 1001 and analogous false statement statutes, such as perjury,
the practice historically has been to have the judge determine materi-
ality. This part demonstrates that courts offered no justification for
this practice, and thus no reason warranted the courts' plain infringe-
ment upon the criminal defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.31 The Court in Gaudin, therefore, made the correct decision to
safeguard the criminal defendant's constitutional right to have a jury
determine all factual elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. An Historical Look at § 1001
Several cases have detailed § 1001's historical background, includ-
ing the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Gilliland' and
United States v. Bramblett.33 As the Court in Bramblett recalled,
§ 1001 evolved from an 1863 statute created to prevent frauds upon
the government. The statute made it a criminal offense for
any person in the land or naval forces of the United States ... [to]
make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented for
payment or approval to or by any person or officer in the civil or
military service of the United States, any claim upon or against the
Government of the United States, or any department or officer
thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent
34
30. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 869-75. While the reasonable doubt
aspect of the Fifth Amendment generally is thought of as favoring individual liberty
by presuming innocence, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan I11, Defenses,
Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Low, 88 Yale Li., 1325, 1346
(1979), others contend that the burden of proof has been established to counteract thejury's potential for favoring the prosecution. See Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb
on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale L.J. 1299,
1306-07 (1977).
31. Nor is there justification to continue the practice in other false statement stat-
utes with similar materiality requirements. Thus, Gaudin should be read as mandat-
ing a change in all of these statutes, as is discussed in part I.
32. 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
33. 348 U.S. 503 (1955), overruled by Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754
(1995). The Court in Hubbard held that § 1001 does not extend to false statements
made in judicial proceedings. 115 S. Ct. at 1757-61, 1765.
34. Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 504-05 (alterations in original) (quoting An Act to pre-




The Bramblett Court noted the statute's breadth in the types of false
statements covered and the definition of false statements.
The statute's scope was extended several times from 1863 to 1934,36
and was further expanded in 1934 to include as punishable conduct,
"false and fraudulent statements or representations where these were
knowingly and willfully used in documents or affidavits 'in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States.' In this, there was no restriction to cases involving pecuniary
or property loss to the government. 37
Congress revised the statute again in 1948, predominantly resulting
in the statute's present form.3s The 1948 amendment resulted in only
minor semantic changes 39 to the 1934 statute, and the Bramblett Court
held that the 1948 revision was not intended to work any substantive
change.4°
Thus, the purpose behind § 1001, like the other statutes criminaliz-
ing false statements, is to deter people from deceiving the govern-
ment. As Judge Kozinski noted in his dissent to the Ninth Circuit's en
banc decision in Gaudin,4 ' these statutes either expressly or implicitly
aim to punish only those deceptions that are material to the govern-
ment investigation or function.42
35. Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 504-05.
36. Id. at 505-06 & n.2 (citing an 1874 change that included "every person," not
just military personnel, and further codifications that extended the statute to cover
corporations in which the United States held stock, and false statements made to
cheat, swindle, or defraud the government, including obtaining a false claim).
37. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) (quoting The Act of June 18,
1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996); see also Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1757-
61, 1765 (1995) (overruling Bramblett upon finding that § 1001 does not extend to
statements made in judicial proceedings).
38. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683 (1949). The false claims provi-
sion became § 287 of Title 18, retaining its prior form without significant change. Sec-
tion 1001 is the "false statements" section. See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S.
503, 508 (1955). The only substantive change enacted since then was the 1994 amend-
ment, which substituted "fined under this title" for "fined not more than $10,000." See
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796, 2147.
39. See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 508 (noting the deletion of the reference to corpora-
tions, and the transposition of the "in any matter" clause to the beginning of the
section).
40. Id.
41. United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), aff'd, 115 S. Ct.
2310 (1995).
42. See Gaudin, 28 F.3d at 961 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Although in the context
of the statutes in which courts have read in the materiality requirement, arguably
courts might have been slower to do so had they thought it would have been viewed
as adding an element that would be required to be proven to the jury.
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B. The Practice of Treating Materiality As a Question of Law
The practice of having judges determine materiality appears to have
been deeply rooted.4 3 The various courts adopting this settled prac-
tice, however, did not provide explanations for treating materiality as
a question of law."4 Thus, the Court's decision in Gaudin seems to
contradict the long-standing trend. The decision was proper, however,
because despite precedent, it protected the constitutionally guaran-
teed Fifth Amendment right of due process4s and the Sixth Amend-
ment right "[iun all criminal prosecutions" to a trial by "an impartial
jury.",
In the 1929 case Sinclair v. United States,47 the Supreme Court con-
firmed that materiality would be determined by the judge in prosecu-
tions for making false statements to the government, a precedent that
survived almost seventy years, until Gaudin.4 8 Although Sinclair con-
cerned a provision of Title 2 that subjects an individual to criminal
43. See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298-99 (1929) (stating that it is
settled that the determination of relevancy is question of law).
44. See id.
45. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
46. See id. amend. VI.
47. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
48. IL at 283. In Gaudin, however, Justice Scalia claimed Sinclair's holding actu-
ally had been whittled away by previous decisions, and the Court in Gaudin was pre-
pared to strike the final blow. "Other reasoning in Sinclair, not yet repudiated, we
repudiate now." United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. CL 2310, 2318 (1995). Justice Scalia
referred to Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456,471-72 (1961) (reversing a 2 U.S.C.
§ 192 conviction because government failed to prove pertinence of the questions), and
to other cases overruling the decisions upon which Sinclair rested. See Gaudin, 115 S.
Ct. at 2318. Justice Scalia mischaracterized Deutch, however. In Deutch, the Court
held that the prosecution had failed to sufficiently prove pertinency, and that this
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the defendant was
not aware of the pertinency at the time of the questioning. Deutch, 367 U.S. at 467-68.
Further, the failure to prove pertinency at trial was problematic because pertinency
was implicitly an element in the standard of criminality. lL at 468. The Court in
Deutch did not, however, hold that pertinency must be proven to a jury because of the
constitutional requirement that a jury must find all factual elements beyond a reason-
able doubt and because pertinency is a factual (or at least partially factual) element.
Justice Scalia also pointed out changes in the law in cases upon which Sinclair re-
lied. He noted that ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447,489 (1894), which held that no right
to a jury trial attaches to criminal contempt proceedings, was overruled by Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-200 (1968) (holding criminal contempts are subject to the
jury trial provision of the Constitution). Further, Horning v. District of Columbia,
254 U.S. 135 (1920), which held that at most it would be harmless error for a trial
judge to order the jury to convict, should be considered an "unfortunate anomaly"
when one considers other contrary holdings such as Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S.
466, 468-69, 472 (1933) (reversing a conviction because the judge impermissibly com-
mented on the evidence and told the jury he believed the defendant lied), and Bihn v.
United States, 328 U.S. 633, 637-39 (1946) (reversing conviction because the judge
impermissibly instructed the jury to place on the defendant the burden of proving her
innocence). See Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2318.
Considering how uniformly the various circuit courts had followed Sinclair, how-
ever, the Sinclair holding apparently was still viable up until the Gaudin decision.
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contempt of Congress for refusal to answer a question relevant to a
congressional inquiry,49 the government's argument in Sinclair ex-
pressly linked the pertinency requirement to materiality requirements
in other false statement statutes, such as perjury.50 The government in
Sinclair contended that materiality in false statement prosecutions was
for the court to decide.5 Writing for the Sinclair Court, Justice Butler
agreed, likening the question of pertinency to questions
concerning relevancy at the trial of issues in court, and it is not es-
sentially different from the question as to materiality of false testi-
mony charged as perjury in prosecutions for that crime. Upon
reasons so well known that their repetition is unnecessary it is uni-
formly held that relevancy is a question of law....
... It would be incongruous and contrary to well-established prin-
ciples to leave the determination of such a matter to a jury.52
Thus, the Court considered the proposition settled and obvious.
While the precedent upon which the Sinclair Court relied may have
been easy to determine, the same cannot be said for the rationale un-
derlying the rule that relevancy is a question of law. Justice Butler
stated that the reasons were known, but those reasons do not appear
in the supporting materials upon which the Sinclair Court relied.
Stripping away the numerous layers of history reveals that no mean-
ingful reason lies at the foundation. Thus, the rule appears to have
ossified for no particular reason outside stare decisis.
49. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 284-85 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 192). 2 U.S.C. § 192 provides:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of
either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any
matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee estab-
lished by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or
any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who,
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question
under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine
of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a commonjail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.
2 U.S.C. § 192 (1994) (emphasis added).
50. For purposes of this Note, materiality, as it is used in 18 U.S.C. § 1001, is con-
sidered analogous to the relevancy requirement, as it is referred to by the Court in
Sinclair, or pertinency, as stated in 2 U.S.C. § 192. See, e.g., Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2318
(comparing "materiality" under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and "pertinency" under 2 U.S.C.
§ 192). The Court in Gaudin stated: "The two questions are similar .... [T]ying
[Sinclair] even closer to the present [case] was our dictum that pertinency 'is not es-
sentially different from... materiality of false testimony....' "Id (quoting Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U.S. 263, 273 (1929)).
51. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263,283-84 (1929) (argument for the United
States). The government argued:
Almost all perjury statutes make the materiality of the alleged false testi-
mony a substantive part of the offense. The courts have held without excep-
tion in a great many cases that the question of the materiality of the alleged
false testimony is one of law for the court, and that it is error for the court to
submit the question to the jury.
Id.
52. Id. at 298-99 (emphasis added).
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For example, the Sinclair Court cited three cases supporting the
proposition that materiality was a matter of law, but none of those
opinions reveals reasons behind the rule. 3 Similarly, the treatises
upon which the Sinclair Court relied do not reveal the rationale be-
hind the practice.5M
Other early federal cases were clear on the rule, holding that mate-
riality is for the court to decide, but they offered no American case
law as support or merely relied on English cases as their precedent.55
Unfortunately, those cases also did not examine the reasons behind
the long-standing rule.
The practice of having courts determine materiality also appeared
unanimously settled by the state courts that considered the issue dur-
ing the nineteenth century. 6 In New York, for example, Power v.
Price57 was clear in its holding,58 but like its federal counterparts
53. Id. at 298 (citing Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1927); United
States v. Singleton, 54 F. 488 (S.D. Ala. 1892); Cothran v. State, 39 Miss. 541 (Miss.
1860)).
54. Id. (citing 1 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 49 (13th
ed. 1876); 5 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evi-
dence in Trials at Common Law §§ 2549, 2550 (2d ed. 1923)).
55. See United States v. Singleton, 54 F. 488, 489-90 (S.D. Ala. 1892) (offering no
case law in support of the holding); United States v. Bedgood, 49 F. 54,60 (S.D. Ala.
1891) (same); United States v. Landsberg, 23 F. 585, 586-87 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (cit-
ing Regina v. Mullany, 169 Eng. Rep. 1528 (1865) and Regina v. Gibbon, 169 Eng.
Rep. 1324 (1861)).
The earliest federal case cited in the government's brief in Gaudin was United
States v. Cowing, 25 F. Cas. 680, 681 (C.C.D.C. 1835) (No. 14,880), where the court
decided the question of materiality itself, but the prosecution argued that materiality
should be decided by the jury. The government's brief in Gaudin characterized Coiv-
ing as a case where the court did not reach the issue of who determines materiality.
See Petitioner's Brief, United States v. Gaudin, No. 94-514, 1995 WL 71510, at *20
n.12 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995). The Cowing court, however, implicitly determined materi-
ality itself "The Court... was of opinion that the indictment was insufficient in not
averring the materiality of the facts upon which the perjury was assigned; and in not
stating facts which would show their materiality." Cowing, 25 F.Cas. at 681. The court
seems to have operated independently, deciding whether enough information justified
a conclusion that the facts were material.
56. See Petitioner's Brief, United States v. Gaudin, No. 94-514, 1995 WL 71510, at
*18-*19 & n.11 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995) (citing Power v. Price, 16 Wend. 450 (N.Y. 1836)
as the earliest of the state cases).
57. 16 Wend. 450 (N.Y. 1836).
58. The case was a 15-7 decision, with a vigorous dissent. The majority opinion
held that when a person commits perjury at a trial, it is obviously material and the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove the absence of materiality. "It was,
therefore, incumbent on the defendant to prove that the words spoken by him related
to an immaterial fact, not an issue in the cause before the justice .... " Id. at 454. As
to materiality.
[T]he court was clearly right in instructing the jury that the testimony given
on the former trial was proved to be material. The court, in this part of its
charge, did not take from the jury the decision of any matter of fact which
was proper for their cognizance: it merely decided a question of law, arising
upon the proof of facts as to which there was no dispute or contrariety of
testimony.
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failed to provide justification for its holding.5 9 Louisiana was the only
state that characterized materiality as a question of fact, but even
Louisiana had adopted the majority view by 1903.60
Treatises other than those cited by the Sinclair Court were similarly
unrevealing.61 Francis Wharton's treatise provides valuable insight
into the situation. In one edition, Wharton's treatise expressly con-
cludes that materiality is for the court to decide,62 relying on a line of
English and American cases:
[T]he weight of authority is that it would be error to leave the ques-
tion to the jury without definite instruction from the court. And the
proper course is for the court, assuming all the evidence to be true,
to determine whether the particular article of evidence is or is not
material. Any dispute as to the truth of facts, however, must go to
the jury.63
Id. at 456.
Senator Edwards dissented on both points, contending not only is the burden on
the plaintiff to prove materiality, but that materiality needs to be determined by the
jury:
Is the question of materiality a subject for the court or for the jury? The
principle is recognized and maintained, in the several decisions of the
Supreme Court to which I have referred, that it is necessary for the plaintiff
to prove the materiality of the testimony in the justice's court .... If it is a
matter of testimony, a fact the plaintiff is bound to prove, and so important
that he cannot maintain his action without proving it, who are to weigh the
testimony and determine whether the fact is proved? Is it not addressed to
the jury?-and are not they to deliberate upon it, and to be satisfied whether
it proves this fact that the testimony was material, and as they shall satisfy
themselves, from their own deliberations, find their verdict? Could they
conscientiously discharge the duty their oath imposes upon them, by relying
upon the opinion of the court upon a matter of fact?-a matter of fact which
appears to constitute the gist of the action, without the proving of which no
recovery could be had. If the court can take from the jury the right to deter-
mine whether a fact so important is proved, they can take from the parties
the whole benefit of a jury ....
Id. at 457-59.
59. See id. at 456; see also infra notes 60-66.
60. Compare State v. Spencer, 12 So. 135, 138 (La. 1892) (holding that materiality
is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the jury) with State v. Brown,
35 So. 501, 502 (La. 1903) (concluding to the contrary, that generally materiality is a
question of law for the court to decide, but not explicitly mentioning Spencer or hold-
ing the state is adopting a new rule).
61. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
62. These early treatises dealt with materiality in the context of perjury, which is
an analogous situation to the modem false statement statutes such as 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001.
63. 2 Francis Wharton, Wharton's Criminal Law § 1550 (12th ed. 1932). Wharton
cited six cases in support of this proposition, the first two of which were English,
Regina v. Mullany and Regina v. Southwood, and are discussed infra note 68. The
other four cases are relatively clear in their holdings. See State v. Lewis, 10 Kan. 157,
160 (1872) ("The point made on the instructions is that the court left with the jury the
materiality of the alleged false testimony, when he should have decided it himself, and
instructed the jury that it was or was not material. That on a trial for perjury, the
question of the materiality of the alleged false testimony is one of law for the court,
and not one of fact for the jury, is, as a general rule, true. Whether it ever be other-
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Wharton's treatise did not cite a reason for this practice, but one of
the four American cases upon which it relied shed a small ray of light
on the subject: "And the rule of law applies emphatically to evidence
given before a justice of the peace, where what is material and what is
irrelevant is often mingled in admirable confusion."'  Apparently, the
determination was believed by at least one court to be too difficult for
the jury to make, and thus became a question of law by default.
In a later edition, however, Wharton's treatise moved toward the
view of materiality as a mixed question of law and fact, which was
advanced by the Supreme Court in Gaudin:
Ordinarily the materiality of testimony is a question of law for de-
termination by the court in which the defendant is tried for perjury.
If, however, the facts are in dispute so that the materiality cannot be
determined until the facts are first decided, the question of material-
ity is determined by the jury.65
The key difference, however, is that Wharton's treatise viewed materi-
ality as ordinarily a question of law, whereas the Supreme Court in
Gaudin implied that materiality is inherently a mixed question of law
and fact. Further, even when there was a factual determination to be
made, the nineteenth-century state cases appear to indicate that the
judge gave specific jury instructions as to the materiality issue."
wise we care not to inquire.... "); Commonwealth v. Parker, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 212,
221 (1848) (evaluating the evidence itself, court concluded it was material); Steinman
v. McWilliams, 6 Pa. 170, 177 (1847) ("[T]he materiality of the testimony, or the parts
of it alleged to be false, in a trial of this kind, is a matter of law, which ought to be
decided by the court, and not left to the jury."); Washington v. State, 5 S.W. 119, 119-
20 (Tex. Ct. App. 1887) (holding materiality is a question of law for the court).
64. Steinman, 6 Pa. at 177.
65. 3 Francis Wharton, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 1310 (Ronald A.
Anderson ed., 1957) (citations omitted).
66. In Coleman v. State, 118 P. 594 (Okla. Crim. App. 1911), for example, which
was cited in Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 1310 (1957), the defendant was
convicted of perjury and appealed on various grounds, including the trial court's mis-
take of having the jury determine materiality. The court said "that as a general rule
the materiality of testimony is a question of law for the court, but cases may arise
where this materiality depends upon disputed facts, and then becomes a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact, to be submitted to the jury under proper instructions." Coleman,
118 P. at 601. The court offered two possible answers to defendant's appeal.
We can well see the justice of this rule as applied to the facts of the case now
before us. Here the materiality of this testimony depended upon the testi-
mony of other witnesses, which, if true, would make this testimony material.
We therefore think that it was proper for the trial court to submit to the jury
upon the entire testimony in the case the question of the materiality of this
testimony.
Id. The court's other explanation was that the error was harmless, thus barring de-
fendant's appeal. Id.
The Coleman court cited two cases in support of its belief that the jury may decide
materiality in certain circumstances, Young v. People, 24 N.E. 1070 (Ill. 1890), and
Washington v. State, 5 S.W. 119 (Tex. CL App. 1887). Washington v. State, however,
cited by Wharton, see supra note 63, clearly considered materiality a question of law
for the court to decide. That opinion gets a little confusing, however, because it then
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The English treatises were similarly firm as to who decides material-
ity but similarly unenlightening as to the reason.67 The English cases
from the nineteenth Century, some of which formed the basis of the
early American cases, explicitly acknowledge the existence of a mate-
riality requirement, which must be decided by the judge.68 They are
not, however, illuminating on the reasons behind the materiality
requirement.69
says that materiality could "be so mingled with the facts that the court should submit
it, with proper instructions upon the law, to the jury." 5 S.W. at 120. But after citing a
treatise and two other cases, the opinion delivers an express statement that material-
ity is for the judge to decide, not the jury. Id. Apparently, the judge determines mate-
riality based upon a jury's factual findings in those circumstances.
The court in State v. Stilwell, 221 P. 174 (Or. 1923), also cited by Wharton, ap-
peared to determine materiality itself. "Upon a prosecution for perjury, the material-
ity of the alleged false testimony may be shown by introducing all or so much of the
pleadings in the action as show the issues, together with the proof of such facts as tend
to show the testimony to be on a material issue." Id. at 182. The court went on to
state that it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant testified
and that his testimony was wilfully false. As for materiality, it must be established by
evidence, not presumed. Id. While this decision may go to the jury, it appears that it
is under judicial instructions that are tantamount to the court's determining material-
ity. The Stilwell court held that it is the court's duty to instruct the jury as to what
constitutes material testimony. Id
67. See, e.g., Rt. Hon. Lord Hailsham, 11(1) Halsbury's Laws of England, 1 302(4th ed. 1990) ("The question whether a statement which forms the subject of pro-
ceedings for perjury was material is a question of law to be determined by the trial
court."); see also C. H. S. Ffoot, 4 Stephen's Commentaries on the Laws of England
139 (G.C. Cheshire & Sir John Miles eds., 19th ed. 1928) ("The materiality of the
statement is a question of law for the judge . . ").
68. See, e.g., Regina v. Mullany, 169 Eng. Rep. 1528, 1529 (1865) (holding that
materiality determination is for the judge to decide); Regina v. Southwood, 175 Eng.
Rep. 762, 762 (1858) (same); Regina v. Overton, 174 Eng. Rep. 676, 677 (1842)
(same); King v. Nicholl, 109 Eng. Rep. 695, 696 (1830) (reaching same result implic-
itly, with court making materiality determination); Rex v. Dunston, 171 Eng. Rep.
960, 961 (1824) (same as Nicholl).
The lone exception to the settled proposition is Regina v. Lavey, 175 Eng. Rep. 448(1850) in which Lord Campbell instructed the jury to "consider whether the present
defendant swore falsely, and whether she did so wilfully and corruptly, and whether
what she so falsely swore was material, for that is a question I leave to you." Id. at 450(emphasis added). The assertion in Lavey was short-lived, however, being expressly
reversed in Regina v. Gibbon, 169 Eng. Rep. 1324, 1326 (1861). Lavey appears to be
an anomaly, running counter to the vast number of cases holding materiality is for the
court to decide.
69. See Regina v. Gibbon, 169 Eng. Rep. 1324, 1326 (1861); Regina v. Southwood,
175 Eng. Rep. 762, 762 (1858); Regina v. Overton, 174 Eng. Rep. 676, 677 (1842);
King v. Nicholl, 109 Eng. Rep. 695, 696 (1830); Rex v. Dunston, 171 Eng. Rep. 960,
961 (1824).
In Regina v. Courtney, 7 Cox Crim. L. Cas. 111 (Ct. Crim. App. 1856), the judges
chose not to follow the contrary holding in Regina v. Lavey, 175 Eng. Rep. 448, 450
(1850), which held that materiality must be determined by the jury, but the court in
Regina v. Courtney struggled for a justification. Judge Monahan decided the case on
another issue, stating: "[I]t is not absolutely necessary to decide that [the materiality
issue] one way or the other in this case," although he ultimately stated his preference
for having the court determine materiality, without offering a reason. Id. at 118. La-
vey's unusual holding was expressly struck down in Gibbon, 169 Eng. Rep. at 1326.
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While it appears the practice of allowing materiality determinations
by the judge was uniform, with certain recognized exceptions, the
Court in Gaudin viewed the authority as divided. 0 Contrary to Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion, however, a great deal of historical uniformity
supports the view that the practice was settled.71 Despite the error in
While the defense tried to use Lavey as precedent, the court in Gibbon explicitly
overruled it. Stated Judge Channel "I never could understand that ase.. . ." Id.
Believing that the only plausible explanation for the Lavey court's holding was the
jury needed to determine another matter pertaining to the defendant's plea, the Gib-
bon court concluded: "That point having been ascertained, the question of material-
ity was no longer for the jury." Id.
70. See United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2316-18 (1995). Notably, how-
ever, Justice Scalia, the author of Gaudin, seemed to consider the matter settled when
he authored Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988), and that the established
practice mandated that the judge decide materiality. In Kungys the Court held that in
a proceeding to revoke citizenship, the determination of whether concealments or
misrepresentations made to the Immigration and Naturalization Service were mate-
rial is to be made by the judge. IL at 772. While Kungys involved a different statute
than Gaudin, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), Justice Scalia's decision relied upon the Sixth Cir-
cuit's view in United States v. Abadi, 706 F2d 178, 180 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 821 (1983), that materiality in the § 1001 context is determined by the court. The
government in Gaudin understandably put a great deal of stock in Kungys, figuring
that the Court would follow this relatively recent interpretation of § 1001: "As this
Court recently reaffirmed in Kungys, materiality is a legal issue, and the court may
therefore determine it in a prosecution under Section 1001 without depriving the de-
fendant of his right to a trial by jury." Petitioner's Brief, United States v. Gaudin, No.
94-514, 1995 WL 71510, at *11 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995). What would seem like a conun-
drum for the Court, however, was resolved by Justice Scalia in six sentences. See
Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2319-20. Justice Scalia said the questions involved in Kingys
were very different from the materiality determination in Gaudin. While Justice
Scalia noted that Kungys had relied upon Sinclair and Abadi, it was not necessarily a
problem to hold differently in the present case because the circumstances in Ktungys
did not raise Sixth Amendment concerns. Thus, Kungys was, to an extent, an example
of the lesser being included in the greater, and while Sinclair and Abadi may have
dictated a certain result in Kungys, the reverse would not have been true. Justice
Scalia concluded his analysis by stating whatever support iungys lent to the validity
of Sinclair and Abadi "was obiter dicta, and may properly be disregarded." Id. at
2319-20.
71. Another aspect to these cases that generally has been uniform, although Jus-
tice Scalia noted an aberration, is the prosecution generally has been the party argu-
ing in favor of the court determining materiality. It begs the question, however, as to
which party, prosecution or defense, really stands to gain by having the court deter-
mine materiality? Ostensibly, the materiality requirement has been inserted into the
statute to protect defendants from frivolous prosecutions. Further, it appears that
having the jury make this determination hinders the prosecution, giving it one more
item to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Is it necessarily easier, however, for the
prosecution to prove this to the jury as opposed to the judge? In Gaudin, as well as
the bulk of the other cases, the government believed its interests would be better
served by having materiality determined by the court as a matter of law, or at least
that the interests of justice and our society would be best served. More to the point,
Gaudin had been convicted and was trying to find any basis to attain a different result,
which he succeeded in doing.
Cases to the contrary do exist, however, in which the prosecution actually has ar-
gued for the materiality determination to be made by the jury. See Petitioner's Brief,
United States v. Gaudin, No. 94-514, 1995 WL 71510, at *19-20 n.12 (U.S. Feb. 21,
1995) (noting that when faced with an inadequate indictment, the United States ar-
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characterizing the historical approach as divided, the Court correctly
viewed the precedent as contrary to the Constitution, justifying the
Court's opinion.72 The Supreme Court thus refused to bow to the
weight of unreasoned authority in derogation of a criminal defend-
ant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
II. THE BRE.ADTH OF GA UDIN
Gaudin is significant for more than its radical effect on § 1001. For
example, Gaudin impacts dozens of other false statement statutes
whose materiality requirements are similar if not identical to § 1001's.
The Gaudin holding should be extended beyond dictating that materi-
ality in § 1001 prosecutions must be determined by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Even the Ninth Circuit, which ruled materiality in
§ 1001 prosecutions must be determined by the jury, acknowledged
that many other false statement statutes with similar materiality re-
quirements exist, and that the court has decided the issue of material-
ity in numerous cases enforcing such statutes.7 3
Based upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gaudin, materiality
in every false statement statute inevitably will be a mixed question,
which therefore must go to the jury. Justice Scalia rejected the gov-
ernment's contention that materiality in a § 1001 prosecution really
was a question of law:
Deciding whether a statement is "material" requires the determina-
tion of at least two subsidiary questions of purely historical fact: (a)
"what statement was made?"; and (b) "what decision was the
gued that: "The materiality of the matter is a fact to be ascertained by the jury."
(citing United States v. Cowing, 25 F. Cas. 680, 681 (C.C.D.C. 1835) (No. 14,880)));
see also United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 677 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding that the
government successfully argued that court should have a jury make materiality deter-
mination); Coleman v. State, 118 P. 594 (Okla. Crim. App. 1911) (stating that defend-
ant appealed his perjury conviction because the jury determined materiality).
Justice Scalia seemingly dismissed the government's citation to Cowing because it
"places the Government itself in opposition to its position here," Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at
2317. That conclusion misses the government's point that the practice is settled, re-
gardless of a single argument a prosecutor made in 1835. A more thorough investiga-
tion of the cases and which party truly stands to gain by having the judge or jury make
the materiality determination is beyond the scope of this Note.
72. See Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2317-18. As the Court noted: "Since that proposi-
tion is contrary to the uniform general understanding (and we think the only under-
standing consistent with principle) that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require
conviction by a jury of all elements of the crime, we must reject those cases that have
embraced it." Id. at 2318.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 957 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting the practice of a judge determining materiality for
perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621; of false statements to grand juries under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623; of false statements in tax returns under 26 U.S.C. § 7206; and of false state-
ments in applications for payments in federally-approved plans for medical assistance
under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995); see also infra notes 75-76




agency trying to make?"... The ultimate question: (c) "whether
the statement was material to the decision," requires applying the
legal standard of materiality... to these historical facts. What the
Government apparently argues is that the Constitution requires
only that (a) and (b) be determined by the jury, and that (c) may be
determined by the judge. We see two difficulties with this. First, the
application-of-legal-standard-to-fact sort of question posed by (c),
commonly called a "mixed question of law and fact," has typically
been resolved by juries.... The second difficulty with the Govern-
ment's position is that it has absolutely no historical support. 74
Thus, the Court has made clear that while a legal standard is involved,
a statement's materiality inevitably will be a mixed question of law
and fact. While the Court's analysis in Gaudin concerned 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, the formula would be virtually the same for 18 U.S.C. § 1621,
the general perjury statute, or 18 U.S.C. § 1623, which covers false
statements to a grand jury, except that the second question in the
above inquiry would be "(b) what decision was the judge/grand jury
trying to make." The Supreme Court in Gaudin did not limit its hold-
ing or specify how materiality in § 1001 is distinguishable from the
other false statement statutes with similar materiality requirements.
Many other false statement statutes have express materiality require-
ments,75 while other statutes imply such a requirement. 76 Based upon
74. United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2314-15 (1995) (citation omitted).
75. See United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 959-60 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995). Noting statutes with express
materiality requirements likely to be affected if materiality in § 1001 is deemed a jury
question, Judge Kozinski included:
7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(3) (felony to knowingly make statement that "was false or
misleading with respect to any material fact" in report required by statute or
futures association); 8 U.S.C. § 1160(b)(7) (penalizing knowing and willful
false statement of material fact in application for status of special agricul-
tural worker); 8 U.S.C. § 1225a(c)(6) (penalizing knowing and willful false
statement of material fact in application for special status by virtue of enter-
ing U.S. before Jan. 1, 1982); 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (penalizing improper entry
into U.S. by virtue of willful false statement of material fact); 10 U.S.C. § 931
(perjury in military proceeding); 18 U.S.C. § 152 (maximum five year sen-
tence for knowing and fraudulent receipt of material amount of property
with intent to defeat bankruptcy code); 18 U.S.C. § 542 (maximum prison
term of two years for entry of goods by means of material false statement);
18 U.S.C. § 1919 (maximum one year prison term for false statement of ma-
terial fact knowingly made to obtain unemployment compensation for fed-
eral service); 19 U.S.C. § 1629(t)(2) (maximum five year prison term for any
person who knowingly and willfully covers up a material fact from customs
official); 19 U.S.C. § 1919 (maximum two year prison term for knowingly
making false statement of material fact with intent to influence tariff adjust-
ment); 19 U.S.C. § 2316 (maximum one year prison term for knowingly mak-
ing false statement of material fact when seeking relief from injury under
section 2311); 19 U.S.C. § 2349 (maximum two year prison term for making
false statement of material fact for purposes of obtaining relief from injury
under Trade Act of 1974); 20 U.S.C. § 1097(b) (maximum one year prison
term for knowingly and willfully concealing material information in connec-
tion with assignment of federally insured student loan); 20 U.S.C.
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§ 4442(c)(1) (maximum one year prison term for knowingly making false
statement of material fact in seeking cultural and art development grants);
22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2) (maximum six month prison term for willfully making
false statement of material fact in registering to distribute political propa-
ganda); 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (maximum 10 year prison term for willfully mak-
ing untrue statement of material fact in report required for control of arms
exports and imports); 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (maximum three year prison term
for willfully making false declaration as to material matter regarding income
taxes when under penalty of perjury); 26 U.S.C. § 9012(d) (maximum five
year prison term for knowingly and willfully making misrepresentation of
material fact during examination of campaign's matching payment account);
29 U.S.C. § 439(b) (maximum one year prison term for person who know-
ingly makes false statement of material fact in report required under section
431); 29 U.S.C. § 461(d) (maximum one year prison term for knowing mis-
representation of material fact in report labor organization must file once it
assumes trusteeship over subordinate organization); 31 U.S.C. § 5324(b)(2)
(prohibiting material omission or misstatement of fact in report on monetary
instruments transactions); 42 U.S.C. § 290cc-32 (maximum five year prison
term for knowingly making false statement of material fact in sale to state
for items or services funded by federal government under Medicare); 42
U.S.C. § 300d-20 (same); 42 U.S.C. § 300e-17(h) (maximum five year prison
term for knowingly and willfully making false statement of material fact in
an HMO's financial disclosure); 42 U.S.C. § 300w-8(1) (maximum five year
prison term for knowingly and willfully making false statement of material
fact in sale to state of items or services subsidized by federal government);
42 U.S.C. § 300x-56(b) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 300dd-9 (same-under formula
grants to states for care of AIDS patients); 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-19(b) (same-
under funds for AIDS prevention); 42 U.S.C. § 707(a)(1) (same-under
funds for social security); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (maximum five year
prison term for knowingly and willfully making false statement of material
fact in application for payments in federally-approved plans for medical
assistance); 42 U.S.C. § 1383a(a)(1) (maximum one year prison term for
knowingly and willfully making false statement of material fact in applica-
tion for Supplemental Security Income benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 1973i (penaliz-
ing knowingly false information for purpose of establishing eligibility to
vote); 42 U.S.C. § 3795a (penalizing knowing and willful misstatement or
concealment of material fact in any application or record required under
chapter); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) (maximum two year prison term for know-
ingly making false material statement in compliance documents); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6992d(b)(2) (maximum two year prison term for knowingly making false
material statement in compliance documents); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (maxi-
mum two year prison term for knowingly making false material statement in
documents required under chapter); 46 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (any person who, in
application for financial aid under merchant marine act, willfully makes un-
true statement of material fact is guilty of misdemeanor); 46 U.S.C.
§ 31306(d) (maximum five year prison sentence for knowingly making false
statement of material fact in declaration of citizenship under Shipping Act);
46 U.S.C. App. § 839 (maximum five year prison term for knowingly making
false statement of material fact to secure required approval of Secretary of
Transportation); 49 U.S.C.App. § 1472 (maximum three year prison term for
knowingly and willfully falsifying or concealing a material fact to obtain
FAA certificate); 50 U.S.C. § 855 (maximum five year prison term for will-
fully making false statement of material fact in registration statement); 50
U.S.C.App. § 1193(h) (maximum two year prison term for knowingly fur-
nishing information that is false or misleading in any material respect regard-
ing renegotiation of airplane contracts).
28 F.3d at 959-60 n.3 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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76. See id. at 960 n.4 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Listing statutes with implied mate-
riality requirement, Judge Kozinski included:
7 U.S.C. § 614(b-3)(3) (penalizing those who make false statement in appli-
cation for tax-payment warrant); 7 U.S.C. § 2028(d) (punishing those who
obtain funds from a Puerto Rico block grant "by ... false statement"); 7
U.S.C. § 6407(e) (barring "false or unwarranted statements" regarding fluid
milk products); 12 U.S.C. § 1782(a)(3) (penalizing false statement in admin-
istration of insurance fund); 13 U.S.C. § 213 (penalties for perjury); 12
U.S.C. § 1847 (penalizing false entries in book, report, or statement of bank
holding company); 15 U.S.C. § 50 (penalizing false statement to FTC); 15
U.S.C. § 645 (offenses and penalties for certain crimes related to commerce
and trade); 15 U.S.C. § 714m (punishing knowingly false statement to Com-
modity Credit Corporation); 15 U.S.C. § 1825(a)(2)(B) (penalizing false
statement in report required by Horse Protection Act); 16 U.S.C. § 831t(b)
(penalizing false statement to or on behalf of the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (penalizing false claims against U.S. government); 18
U.S.C. § 288 (penalizing false claims for postal losses); 18 U.S.C. § 289 (pe-
nalizing false claims for pensions); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (penalizing knowing false
statement in information gun dealers must provide); 18 U.S.C. § 1011 (pe-
nalizing knowing false statement in sale of mortgage to federal land bank);
18 U.S.C. § 1012 (penalizing intentional false entry in book of Department
of Housing and Urban Development); 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (penalizing false
statement to influence federal loan or credit agency); 18 U.S.C. § 1015 (pe-
nalizing false statement in naturalization proceeding); 18 U.S.C. § 1018 (pe-
nalizing public official who knowingly falsifies official certificate or writing);
18 U.S.C. § 1020 (penalizing false statement regarding highway projects); 18
U.S.C. § 1026 (penalizing false statement regarding farm indebtedness for
purpose of influencing Secretary of Agriculture); 18 U.S.C. § 1027 (penaliz-
ing false statement in documents required by ERISA); 18 U.S.C. § 1158 (pe-
nalizing false statement to secure Indian Arts & Crafts Board trademark); 18
U.S.C. § 1542 (penalizing willful and knowing false statement in passport
application); 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (penalizing false statement in immigration
documents); 18 U.S.C. § 1712 (penalizing falsification of postal returns to
increase compensation); 18 U.S.C. § 1920 (penalizing false statement to ob-
tain Federal employees' compensation); 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (penalizing willful
false statement when registering certain organizations); 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a)
(penalizing willful false statement with intent to interfere with armed forces
during war); 18 U.S.C. § 2424 (penalizing knowing and willful false state-
ment about alien procured or maintained for immoral purposes); 22 U.S.C.
§ 1980(g) (penalizing false statement in seeking compensation for loss or de-
struction of commercial fishing vessel or gear); 22 U.S.C. § 2197(n) (penaliz-
ing false statement regarding federal insurance of investment in foreign
nations); 26 U.S.C. § 7232 (penalizing false statement regarding registration
as manufacturer or dealer in gasoline); 29 U.S.C. § 666(g) (penalizing false
statement in health and safety report required under this chapter); 30 U.S.C.
§ 820 (penalizing false statement in document required under subchapter
governing mine safety and health); 30 U.S.C. § 941 (penalizing false state-
ment or representation in seeking benefits under subchapter governing mine
safety and health); 30 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (penalizing false statement in re-
port submitted with reclamation fee); 30 U.S.C. § 1268(g) (penalizing false
statement in documents required by Federal program or Federal Lands pro-
gram regarding surface mining); 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (penalizing willful viola-
tions of subchapter); 33 U.S.C. § 931 (penalizing false statement for purpose
of obtaining workers' compensation benefit); 33 U.S.C. § 990(b) (penalizing
false statement to corporation governing Saint Lawrence Seaway); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(2) (penalizing knowing false statement in record required by chap-
ter on navigation and navigable waters); 38 U.S.C. § 1987 (penalizing know-
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the general terms of the Supreme Court's holding, not only does the
opinion mandate that materiality in § 1001 prosecutions be deter-
mined by a jury, but that materiality in all false statement prosecu-
tions similarly must be determined by a jury.77
The reasons for reaching this conclusion are relatively straightfor-
ward. First, the structure of the various statutes is nearly identical.
The language of 18 U.S.C. § 100178 is nearly identical to that of 18
U.S.C. § 162179 and 18 U.S.C. § 1623, °8 to cite just two examples. All
three statutes contain a materiality requirement, which Congress in-
ing false statement in application, waiver of premium, or claim for benefits,
for National Service Life Insurance or U.S. Government life insurance); 40
U.S.C. § 883(b) (penalizing false statement to Pennsylvania Avenue Devel-
opment Corp.); 42 U.S.C. § 408 (penalizing false statement to obtain social
security benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 1761(o) (penalizing false statement in connec-
tion with summer food service programs for children at service institutions);
42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (penalizing knowing false information for purpose of
establishing eligibility to vote); 42 U.S.C. § 3220 (penwing [sic] false state-
ment to obtain financial assistance or defraud Secretary of Department of
Health and Human Services); 42 U.S.C. § 4912(c) (penalizing false statement
in documents filed pursuant to chapter's noise control requirements); 43
U.S.C. § 1350(c) (penalizing knowing false statement in application required
under subchapter on submerged public lands); 45 U.S.C. § 231(l)(a) (penal-
izing knowing false statement in report required by subchapter on Rail Road
Retirement Accounts); 45 U.S.C. § 359(a) (penalizing knowing false state-
ment to obtain unemployment insurance); 49 U.S.C. Appx. § 2216 (penaliz-
ing U.S. officials who knowingly make false statement regarding projects
submitted for approval of Secretary of Transportation).
28 F.3d at 960 n.4 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 958-961 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). As Judge Kozinski stated:
The disruption is greater still. I've only mentioned five statutes-ones
where our circuit has already held who decides materiality. But the major-
ity's theory easily covers all statutes that contain a similar materiality re-
quirement. How many other criminal statutes punish those who make
material false statements to a government agency? My research discloses
forty-three that have explicit materiality requirements and another fifty-four
where such a requirement is probably implied. And, of course, other courts
have already held that materiality in a number of these statutes should be
decided by the judge, and will no doubt interpret the others consistent with
their prevailing case law.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Intuitively one may think that § 1001 is an all-encompassing statute that covers all
other false statement statutes. This is not the case, however, because § 1001 is simply
a residual statute to criminalize false statements not specifically enumerated in more
specialized false statement statues. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358,
1363 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[Tlhe section need not 'swallow up' other federal statutes
prohibiting the making of a specific kind of false representation. Instead, properly
construed, the statute serves as a catch-all, reaching those false representations that
might 'substantially impair the basic functions entrusted by law to [the particular]
agency,' but which are not prohibited by other statutes. The legislative history reveals
no evidence of an intent to pyramid punishment for offenses covered by another stat-
ute as well as by § 1001." (quoting United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1110-11
(9th Cir. 1972))).
78. See supra note 3.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1621, which covers perjury, provides in pertinent part:
Whoever-
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tended to have equal force. The prosecutor must show the false state-
ment in question under each statute was material.81
Second, the policy reason for having a materiality requirement does
not vary from one false statement statute to the other. The require-
ment that false statements be material has historical roots tracing back
at least to seventeenth-century England.82 It arose because courts and
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in
any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be admin-
istered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any writ-
ten testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is
true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material
matter which he does not believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty
of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code,
wilfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to
be true; is guilty of pejury ....
Id. (1994).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1623, which covers false declarations before grand jury or court,
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or
statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title
28, United States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or
grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declara-
tion or makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper, doc-
ument, record, recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain
any false material declaration, shall be fined [not more than S10,000] or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both....
(c) An indictment or information for violation of this section alleging that, in
any proceedings before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States, the defendant under oath has knowingly made two or more declara-
tions, which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily
false, need not specify which declaration is false if -
(1) each declaration was material to the point in question, and
(2) each declaration was made within the period of the statute of limita-
tions for the offense charged under this section.
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in
the indictment or information shall be established sufficient for conviction
by proof that the defendant while under oath made irreconcilably contradic-
tory declarations material to the point in question in any proceeding before
or ancillary to any court or grand jury.
Id. (1994).
81. The Court's mandate in Gaudin only applies if materiality is deemed to be an
element of the crime charged. Some of the statutes likely to be affected may not have
express materiality requirements, but a materiality requirement has been read into
the statute, as is the case in two of the clauses in § 1001. See, e.g., United States v.
Wells, 63 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Like 18 U.S.C. § 1001 ... the statute at issue
in this case, 18 U.S.C. § 1014, on its face does not limit its coverage to those false
statements which are material. However, it has been well established that materiality
of the statement is an element of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.").
82. See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988). In a prosecution under
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), to denaturalize an immigrant who allegedly had procured citizen-
ship by concealing or misrepresenting a material fact, the Court analyzed the materi-
ality requirement, stating:
The term "material" in § 1451(a) is not a hapax legomenon. Its use in the
context of false statements to public officials goes back as far as Lord Coke,
who defined the crime of perjury as follows:
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legislatures did not want to punish de minimis false statements. The
underlying reason to proscribe and prosecute only material false state-
ments is logical:83 The court's time should not be wasted with mean-
ingless prosecutions, and society likely would reject a statute that
criminalized any immaterial false statement as both overbroad and
purposeless. 84
Attempts to distinguish § 1001 from other false statement statutes
have not proven convincing. The Ninth Circuit en banc panel in
Gaudin85 and the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Daily86 specifically
mentioned that while materiality should be determined by the jury in
a § 1001 prosecution, it was considered a matter of law for the court to
decide in other false statement prosecutions.' Those courts, however,
"Perjury is a crime committed, when a lawful oath is ministered by any
that hath authority, to any person, in any judicial proceeding, who sweareth
absolutely, and falsly in a matter material to the issue, or cause in question,
by their own act, or by the subornation of others." 3 E. Coke, Institutes 164(6th ed. 1680).
Blackstone used the same term, writing that in order to constitute "the
crime of wilful and corrupt perjury" the false statement "must be in some
point material to the question in dispute; for if it only be in some trifling
collateral circumstance, to which no regard is paid," it is not punishable. 4
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *137.... Given these common-law anteced-
ents, it is unsurprising that a number of federal statutes criminalizing false
statements to public officials use the term "material."
Id. at 769.
83. Even in statutes where the materiality requirement either is not expressly
stated or it appears only in one of several clauses of the statute, as is the case in§ 1001, courts have read in materiality requirements to avoid illogical results.
Admittedly, [18 U.S.C.] § 542 does not on its face include the word "mate-
rial." It does, however, require that the attempt to introduce imported mer-
chandise into the United States be "by means of any false statement.".. . If
the false statement is not material, it cannot be said that the attempt was
made to import the merchandise "by means of" the statement.
United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
When the Sixth Circuit considered materiality under § 1001 in United States v.
Abadi, 706 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983), the court concluded it
was not an element that must be determined by the jury, but "a judicially-imposed
limitation to insure the reasonable application of the statute." Id. at 180 n.2. The
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469 (11th Cir. 1985), also con-
sidering a conviction under § 1001, stated: "[T]he requirement of materiality has
been read into the statute in order to exclude trivial falsifications from its coverage."
Id. at 1472.
84. This is what Justice Scalia contended in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957(1991). When discussing criminal sentence proportionality, Justice Scalia wrote:
Neither Congress nor any state legislature has ever set out with the objective
of crafting a penalty that is 'disproportionate' .... This is not to say that
there are no absolutes; one can imagine extreme examples that no rational
person, in no time or place, could accept. But for the same reason these
examples are easy to decide, they are certain never to occur.
Id. at 985-86.
85. United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), aff'd, 115 S. Ct.
2310 (1995).
86. 921 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991).
87. See Gaudin, 28 F.3d at 945; Daily, 921 F.2d at 1004.
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failed to explain the distinction. The absence of any such explanation
highlights the reason why the holding in Gaudin should be applied to
other false statement statutes with similar materiality requirements.
In determining whether materiality is a factual element of a § 1001
prosecution, thereby triggering the Winship requirement that it be de-
cided by a jury,s the majority in the Ninth Circuit's en banc Gaudin
opinion explained that materiality obviously is a factual element:
Only if it can be said that there is no factual component to the de-
termination of materiality and, thus, that it is a pure question of law,
would the Sixth Amendment constraint not apply. However, if it is
a mixed question of law and fact, then it must be submitted to the
jury. It would not be faithful to the Sixth Amendment for the judge
to decide the factual component of the element necessary to consti-
tute the crime.89
In Gaudin the Ninth Circuit en banc panel cited United States v.
Valdez' as the basis of its holding that materiality in a § 1001 offense
is a factual element.9' The Ninth Circuit further relied on Valdez for
the proposition that § 1001 is the exception to the rule.
We recognize that most other circuits have held that the determina-
tion of materiality in criminal perjury and false statement statutes is
a question of law for determination by the judge. In our circuit, we
have held that the issue of materiality in most of these statutes is a
question of law for the judge. The exception has been section 1001
cases, in which we have held that it is an element of the crime that
must be determined by the jury. On the basis of Valdez, we re-
versed Gaudin's convictions... because the district court removed
the issue from the jury, instructing that the Government had estab-
lished materiality as a matter of law.92
Neither the Ninth Circuit's en banc Gaudin decision nor the analysis
in Valdez, however, explain how § 1001 is different than other false
statement statutes with materiality requirements.
In Valdez, the Ninth Circuit did not engage in a thorough Sixth
Amendment analysis regarding the materiality determination. As to
defendant's argument on this point, the court merely noted: "Appel-
lants argue that the materiality issue should have been submitted to
the jury. We agree, but conclude that the failure to do so was not
88. See supra note 16, discussing Winship requirement.
89. 28 F.3d at 949.
90. 594 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1979).
91. See United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), aff'd,
115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995).
92. Id. at 945 (citing United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725,728-29 (9th Cir. 1979)).
93. While the court discussed the Sixth Amendment as it pertained to the defend-
ant, it did so in reference to defendant's contention that his right to compulsory pro-
cess has been violated when a material witness was permitted to leave the compulsory
process jurisdiction of the court. See Valdez, 594 F.2d at 728.
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reversible error.19 4 The Ninth Circuit in Valdez did not have occasion
to consider materiality in the § 1001 context as compared to other
false statement statutes, and its brief statement did not give the Ninth
Circuit en banc panel a great deal of guidance in Gaudin.
The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Daily also highlights the incongruity
of treating § 1001 differently than other false statement statutes with
materiality requirements. The Daily court concluded that materiality
is an essential element of a § 1001 prosecution, referring to its prior
holding that materiality "like other essential elements, must ordinarily
be submitted on proper instructions for determinations by the jury.''95
After noting that most other federal circuit courts hold to the con-
trary, the Daily court noted that in the context of other false state-
ment statutes, such as perjury before a grand jury under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623, the general perjury statute under 18 U.S.C. § 1621, and falsifi-
cation of a tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), the matter is consid-
ered a question of law.9 6
The Tenth Circuit, as had the Ninth Circuit, failed to state a reason
for the divergent treatment of these false statement statutes, and the
cases upon which it relied similarly were silent.97 The various courts
have thus drawn a baffling and arbitrary line, with § 1001 on one side
and all other false statement statutes on the other.
In advocating the constitutional importance of jury determinations
of all elements of a criminal prosecution, the Ninth Circuit en banc
panel in Gaudin hinted that treating materiality as a matter of law in
other false statement statutes was difficult to justify. After noting that
"[i]t would seem that a factual inquiry would nearly always be neces-
sary to determine what makes a difference to the decisionmaking
body,"98 the Ninth Circuit en banc panel specifically considered mate-
riality in perjury prosecutions. The court acknowledged a valid dis-
tinction between determining relevancy when admitting evidence,
which is clearly for the judge to decide, and materiality. The Ninth
Circuit went on to state, however, that "[e]ven in perjury cases, it is
difficult to say there is no factual component,"9 suggesting that it
94. Id. at 729.
95. United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 1004 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 952 (1991). The Daily court struggled with its conclusion that materiality in
§ 1001 should be treated as an element of law, but felt constrained to do so because of
the Supreme Court's recent holding in Kungys. Id. at 1004-05. Regardless of the
Tenth Circuit's view regarding § 1001, it still maintained the practice of treating mate-
riality in other false statement statutes as a question of law. Id. at 1004.
96. Id. (citations omitted).
97. See United States v. Vap, 852 F.2d 1249, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 for false statements to a grand jury); United
States v. Masters, 484 F.2d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 1973) (discussing prosecution for
perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621).
98. United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), aff'd, 115
S. Ct. 2310 (1995).
99. Id.
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would "be more faithful to Sixth Amendment requirements to instruct
the jury that the statement in question was admissible evidence in the
former trial and leave the question to the jury as to whether it could
have tended to influence the prior jury."'100
Thus, the Ninth Circuit en banc panel in Gaudin was at a loss to
explain how § 1001 differed from other false statement statutes with
materiality requirements. The Ninth Circuit seemed to conclude that
materiality in all false statements must go to the jury, stating: "[I]t
seems to be courting constitutional error to withdraw the materiality
question from the jury in other perjury and false statement cases be-
cause of the difficulty in concluding that there is no factual component
for jury determination."'' Yet the Ninth Circuit rendered a more
limited decision, holding only that materiality in the § 1001 context
was a factual element for the jury to decide," but reserving the issue
of materiality in other contexts.
Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Gaudin, absent any limita-
tions or distinctions, will apply to the various other false statement
statutes with materiality requirements. 10 3 While the Supreme Court
has employed such silent strategies before,1°4 the Supreme Court's
100. Id.
101. Id at 949.
102. 1& at 952.
103. Apparently, other courts have read Gaudin and reached the same conclusion.
See e.g., United States v. Nash, 64 F.3d 504, 507-08 (9th Cir. 1995) (reviewing convic-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 for submitting false tax returns to bank, and holding that
materiality requirement, in the wake of Gaudin, must be determined by jury). The
Ninth Circuit stated: "Gaudin's reasoning appears to admit of no exception that
would suggest that materiality under § 1014 is nonetheless a question of law." Id. at
508; see also United States v. Wells, 63 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 1995). In Wells, also a
prosecution under § 1014, the Eighth Circuit stated:
Because the statute requires proof of the materiality of a false statement,
materiality is an element of § 1014. Gaudin, therefore, dictates that we va-
cate the defendants' convictions on both counts .... The trial court's deter-
mination of materiality as a matter of law denied the defendants'
constitutional right to have a jury determine each and every element of a
charged crime, including the materiality of a false statement charged under
§ 1014 and under the § 371 charge of a conspiracy to violate § 1014.
Id. at 751; United States v. Keys, No. 93-50281, 1995 WVL 574226, at 05 (9th Cir. July
28, 1994) (applying Gaudin to prosecution for false statements to grand jury under 18
U.S.C. § 1623); United States v. Pearson, 897 F. Supp. 1147, 1150 (C.D. IML Aug. 30,
1995) (same).
The Supreme Court seemingly has also taken an expansive view of its decision in
Gaudin, by virtue of its recent grant of certiorari in two cases, vacating the judgments
and remanding to the respective circuit courts of appeal to consider in light of
Gaudin. See United States v. Kapoor, No. 93 CR. 1978 (CSH), 1994 WL 174019
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994), aff'd, 54 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 1995), judgment vacated by 116 S.
Ct. 43 (1995); see also Porat v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2604 (1995) (remanding to
Third Circuit regarding conviction for false statements before a grand jury under 18
U.S.C. § 1623); United States v. Porat, 17 F.3d 660 (3d Cir. 1994).
104. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-61 (1987) (limiting the
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the mail fraud statute, to prosecutions for depravation of
actual property only). Prior to McNally, the statute had been read expansively, al-
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opinion in Gaudin nonetheless should be read as having a similar ef-
fect on other false statement statutes. If facing a case dealing with
another false statement statute in the future, the Court may find a
means of distinguishing that statute and issuing a holding different
from the one in Gaudin. In light of Gaudin, however, a presumption
that all materiality questions must go to the jury seems warranted.
Based upon the broad language of the Supreme Court's holding, 05
Gaudin should extend to prosecutions under all false statement stat-
utes with materiality requirements. In Gaudin, the Supreme Court
was concerned about the importance of the Due Process rights of the
Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment's assurance to afford
criminal defendants "a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury.' 0 6 Those constitutional concerns not only impact courts by
mandating the Gaudin holding, but require that criminal defendants
be protected from legislative attempts to circumvent these rights as
well. The next part examines the broader issue of mixed questions of
law and fact and the need to protect the Gaudin rationale against leg-
islative circumvention.
III. PROTECTING THE JURY RIGHT FROM LEGISLATIVE
TAMPERING
Gaudin, breaking from a settled but unjustified practice, established
that materiality in a § 1001 prosecution is a mixed question of law and
fact that must be determined by the jury.10 7 This Note argues that
materiality in other false statement statutes should be addressed in the
same way.108 The question then arises if, in the wake of Gaudin, Con-
gress could circumvent the Supreme Court's mandate by redrafting
§ 1001 and removing materiality from the jury by expressly defining it
as a question of law.
lowing conviction for fraud perpetrated against property or for deprivation of intangi-
ble rights, such as the right to legitimate government. See id. at 365-66 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). While reversing a trend, the Court's opinion in McNally left unstated
how expansively the holding should be read.
105. See United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2314-15 (1995).
106. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2313-15. One cause for the
contention that the Court was taking such a firm stance on the constitutional right to a
jury determination and to have all factual elements determined beyond a reasonable
doubt is the Court's analysis in Gaudin. The Court long has abided by the maxim that
it does not rush into constitutional analysis if it is not necessary. See In re Snyder, 472
U.S. 634, 642 (1985) (stating constitutional issues are avoided when resolution of a
constitutional issue is not necessary for disposition of the case). If, for example, the
government in Gaudin merely had misread Congress's intent behind 18 U.S.C. § 1001,
the Court's opinion would have discussed legislative history and other factors explain-
ing what Congress really intended. Instead, the Court jumped right into the constitu-
tional analysis, explaining how the government's view violated Gaudin's
constitutional rights. See Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2313-14 (first point of Court's opinion
addresses Fifth and Sixth Amendment requirements).
107. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2314, 2319-20.
108. See supra part II; see also cases cited supra note 103.
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If Congress or a state legislature attempted to do this, with either
§ 1001 or another of the false statement statutes, such an action would
be unconstitutional. 109 Materiality will always have two components:
The jury must find facts and apply legal principles to them,10 thereby
making it a mixed question of law and fact."' Regardless of how a
legislature labels materiality, it cannot alter what materiality truly is.
Because it necessarily has a factual component, materiality must be
determined by the jury in order to maintain the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment guarantees, as mandated by the Supreme Court in
Gaudin.
A. Recognizing a Definition of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
Grandly stating that materiality must be determined by the jury be-
cause it is a mixed question of law and fact, without more, can result
in circular reasoning that is without substance. The basis for this char-
acterization requires further explanation. The Supreme Court in
Gaudin offered a concise analysis, noting that mixed questions of law
and fact are "the application-of-legal-standard-to-fact sort of ques-
tion[s]," which "typically [are] resolved by juries.""'  The Court in
Gaudin followed the definition upon which the Court has relied in a
variety other contexts.
In TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.," 3 a case involving securities
fraud, the Court defined mixed questions of law and fact as "the appli-
cation of a legal standard to a particular set of facts.""' 4 In Pullman-
Standard v. Swint,115 a case involving alleged discrimination violating
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court considered the
standard of review regarding a district court's findings of fact. Dis-
cussing mixed questions of law and fact, Justice White defined them as
"questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established,
109. See e.g., Sasnett v. Department of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305, 1315-16
(W.D. Wis. 1995) (upholding, among other things, constitutionality of the Religious
Freedom of Restoration Act, but noting that the term "Restoration" actually was an
incorrect characterization, because "'Congress writes laws but cannot-it does not
and cannot overrule the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution and thus
it is unable to "restore" a prior interpretation of the First Amendment.'" (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 88, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 15 n.3 (1993)); see also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983) (holding that section of Immigration and Nationality Act that
authorized a one-House veto was unconstitutional because it violated the constitu-
tional requirement that legislative actions be passed by a majority of both Houses of
Congress). As Chief Justice Burger noted, writing for the Court in Chadha: "[Tihe
fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Consti-
tution." Id. at 944.
110. United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2314 (1995).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2314.
113. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
114. Id. at 450.
115. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
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the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy
the statutory standard." 116
The Court also has considered mixed questions of law and fact in
habeas corpus cases," 7 examining how mixed questions of law and
fact implicate constitutional concerns. In Brown v. Allen,"18 Justice
Frankfurter's separate opinion" 9 defines mixed questions of law and
fact as situations "[w]here the ascertainment of the historical facts
does not dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation of the legal
significance of such facts ... [that require a] blend of facts and their
legal values."' 2 ° Thus, a mixed question of law and fact in constitu-
tional cases can be defined as the "application of constitutional princi-
ples to the facts.''
Some commentators have criticized the concept of mixed questions
of law and fact,a" contending that such an issue truly is a question of
law, but to justify the jury making the determination it must be char-
acterized as having some factual element.2 3 Others, in addition to
noting that juries and judges do not have completely separate roles,2 4
116. Id. at 289 n.19.
117. The focus in habeas corpus cases regarding mixed questions of law and fact
often is whether the appellate judge can review de novo or under the "clearly errone-
ous" standard. See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 288-91 (1992) (noting that
mixed constitutional questions are reviewed de novo). These cases shed light upon a
definition of mixed questions of law and fact. Further, they demonstrate the care with
which the Court has guarded review of mixed questions of law and fact when constitu-
tional concerns are implicated. Id.
118. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
119. Id. at 488 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
120. Id. at 507.
121. Id. More generally, as the Court later noted in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293(1963), rev'd on other grounds, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), "mixed
questions of fact and law... require the application of a legal standard to the histori-
cal-fact determinations." 372 U.S. at 309 n.6. The Elevent Circuit in Grizzell v. Wain-
wright, 692 F.2d 722, 725 (11th Cir. 1982), also a habeas corpus case, stated: "From
decisions in areas involving other types of constitutional errors, it appears that the
existence of constitutional harmless error is a mixed question of law and fact because
it requires 'the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.'" (quot-
ing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).
122. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 111, 112-15 (1924) (noting the shortcomings of the term "mixed questions of law
and fact" because it is not unique to those types of questions to have the jury deter-
mine facts acting under the court's directions to follow broad principles of law;
"Every question which is left to the jury is to be determined in the same way.").
123. Bohien, supra note 122, at 114. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of
special verdicts, see Edmund M. Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Spe-
cial Interrogatories, 32 Yale LJ. 575 (1923).
124. See James B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law
185 (1898) [hereinafter Treatise on Evidence].
Courts pass upon a vast number of questions of fact that do not get on the
record, or form any part of the issue. Courts existed before juries; juries
came in to perform only their own special office; and the courts have always
continued to retain a multitude of functions which they exercised before
ever juries were heard of, in ascertaining whether disputed things be true. In
other words, there is not, and never was, any such thing in jury trials as an
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have proposed definitions that arguablywould put a finding of materi-
ality within the province of the court. z
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has defined materiality as a mixed
question of law and fact, 1 6 and thus has enumerated standards by
which various mixed questions of law and fact can be identified. The
Supreme Court in Gaudin had no difficulty identifying materiality as a
mixed question of law and fact. The determination entailed the find-
ing of fact and subsequent application of legal principles, thereby trig-
gering the jury requirement. 12 7 Thus, under the Supreme Court's
analysis, regardless of what a legislature were to label materiality, the
essential commingling of legal principle and fact renders it a mixed
question of law and fact that must be determined by the jury.12
allotting of all questions of fact to the jury. The jury simply decides some
questions of fact .... [T]he allotment to the jury of matters of fact, even in
the strict sense of fact which is in issue, is not exact. The judges have always
answered a multitude of questions of ultimate fact, of facts which form part
of the issue.
Id. at 185, 202; see also 9 John H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American Sys-
tem of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2549, at 500 (3d ed. 1940); Thayer, Law
and Fact, supra note 8, at 169-70 (concluding that mixed questions of law and fact do
not require the jury to make a different type of decision, but the difference between
factual determination and mixed questions of law and fact is one of degree because
the jury has an exact legal standard or principle to follow as opposed to a more gen-
eral one); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 903-11 (noting American history under
which juries were allowed to decide both issues of law and fact and evolution to mod-
ern-day practice of having juries determine only facts).
125. See Thayer, Law and Fact, supra note 8, at 153. Attempting to draw the line
between the two categories, Thayer posited that questions of law are defined as those
with "a rule or standard which it is the duty of a judicial tribunal to apply and en-
force." Id. As the government contended in Gaudin, the determination is not one
that varies from case to case depending upon what facts the jury finds, but it revolves
around a consistent judicial determination of what activities fall under a governmental
agency's jurisdiction. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
126. See United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310,2314-15 (1995); see also Wright v.
West, 505 U.S. 277, 288-91 (1992) (recognizing that mixed questions of law and fact
require the application of legal principles to factual findings); Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963) (same). But see George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion,
1986 Duke L. 747, 772 & n.117 ("Identifying mixed questions of law and fact is a
source of much judicial disagreement."). Christie points to several Supreme Court
cases with seemingly incongruous results. Id. (discussing, for example, Maggio v.
Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983)).
127. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2314-15. As the Court stated:
[T]he Government surely does not mean to concede that the jury must pass
upon all elements that contain some factual component, for that test is amply
met here.... The ultimate question. . . "whether the statement was material
to the decision," requires applying the legal standard of materiality ... to
these historical facts.... [T]he application-of-legal-standard-to-fact sort of
question... commonly called a "mixed question of law and fact," has typi-
cally been resolved by juries.
Id- at 2314 (emphasis added).
128. The concern that courts will not be able to regularly identify mixed questions
of law and fact in the face of other characterizations is assuaged by the Gaudin opin-
ion. The government in Gaudin argued that materiality in this context should be
deemed a purely legal question, likening it to jurisdiction. See Reply Brief for the
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B. Confronting the Concern of Legislative Tampering
Nonetheless, in the wake of Gaudin, Congress could draft a false
statement statute that lists materiality as an element, but also ex-
pressly states that materiality in this context is a question of law. The
hypothetical may not be that outlandish, considering that legislatures
have altered criminal statutes to remove long-standing elements from
the prosecution's burden of proof and relabeled them affirmative de-
fenses that must be proven by the defendant. In fact, in his concurring
opinion to Gaudin, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized the power that
legislatures have to draft statutes, noting that the Court's holding in
Gaudin in no way "stands as a barrier to legislatures that wish to de-
fine-or that have defined-the elements of their criminal laws in
such a way as to remove issues such as materiality from the jury's
consideration. 129
United States, United States v. Gaudin, No. 94-514, 1995 WL 170217, at *6-8 (U.S.
Apr. 10, 1995); Oral Argument Transcript, United States v. Gaudin, No. 94-514, 1995
WL 243257, at *5-6, *8-9 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1995). The government's contention was that
materiality in a § 1001 prosecution should be considered a question of law because it
did not involve a factual determination. Oral Argument Transcript, United States v.
Gaudin, No. 94-514, 1995 WL 243257, at *6 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1995). Determining
whether a false statement had the potential for misleading a government agency de-
pended upon that agency's duties, or put another way, its jurisdiction. Thus, a judge
would be qualified to determine what that agency's duties are, and thus whether a
given false statement had the potential for misleading that agency. There were no
facts to be found in order to determine materiality. Id. at *22.
The Court appeared to agree with the government's characterization. See id. at *32-
33. As Justice Breyer noted: "Yes, but you see judges are not only experts on court
proceedings [to determine materiality of perjury. They're also experts on how regu-
latory programs work, how statute books work, how when you understand-that's a
fairly close analogy." Id. at *33. The Court ultimately decided materiality had a fac-
tual and legal component, thereby making it a mixed question of law and fact. The
Court's ability to rely on its definition and reach its decision in Gaudin bolsters the
contention that courts are able to identify mixed questions of law and fact.
129. United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310,2321 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring). Chief Justice Rehnquist:
We have noted that " '[t]he definition of the elements of a criminal offense is
entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which
are solely creatures of statute.'" Within broad constitutional bounds, legis-
latures have flexibility in defining the elements of a criminal offense. Fed-
eral and State legislatures may reallocate burdens of proof by labeling
elements as affirmative defenses, or they may convert elements into "sen-
tencing factor[s]" for consideration by the sentencing court. The Court to-
day does not resolve what role materiality plays under § 1001.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (alterations in original) (quoting Staples v. United
States, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1796 (1994) (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,
424 (1985)) (citations omitted)).
The Ninth Circuit majority opinion in the Gaudin en banc decision also noted the
power possessed by legislatures:
When a statute expressly provides for materiality as an element of the crime,
it can hardly be said that it is not an element. If, in construing the intent of
Congress, the courts determine that materiality was intended by Congress to
be an element of the crime, a similar result would seem apparent.
FALSE STATEMENT STATUTES
In re Winship3 ' stated that due process requires all factual elements
in criminal prosecutions be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.131 The
Supreme Court later considered how Winship should be applied in the
context of legislative power to draft statutes, holding in Mullaney v.
Wilbur 32 that legislatures were not free to define crimes as they
pleased, thereby unconstitutionally shifting burdens of proof to crimi-
nal defendants.133 In Mullaney, Maine required that a homicide de-
fendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he killed in a
sudden heat of passion based on adequate provocation."M The Court
in Mullaney held that the prosecution was required under Winship "to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion
on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a
homicide case."' 35 Justice Powell's opinion in Mullaney discussed
Winship's holding and the fear that state legislatures could manipulate
its mandate: "[A] State could undermine many of the interests that
[Winship] sought to protect without effecting any substantive change
in its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that
constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear
solely on the extent of punishment."'136
United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citation omitted),
aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995). In recognizing legislative power to define statutory of-
fenses, the next logical step arguably is legislative power to define elements as ques-
tions of law or questions of fact.
130. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
131. "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reason-
able doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the ac-
cused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364.
The Court's express holding was not particularly revolutionary, however, because
seemingly no dispute had existed regarding that standard as it pertained to adult crim-
inal defendants. The dispute in Winship arose as to whether the defendant, who was a
minor, deserved the same constitutional protection as an adult. Thus, Winship can be
read narrowly, as merely extending the reasonable doubt standard to minor criminal
defendants. The problem with that reading, however, is that it is open to arbitrary
results, inviting legislatures to draft criminal statutes that are more general, forcing
defendants to prove as affirmative defenses what previously had been elements of the
crime. The alternative is a procedural reading of Winship, which would mandate that
all factual elements of the crime-elements being defined by normative or historical
standards and not by what legislatures chose to label as elements-must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 30, at 1328-31.
132. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
133. Id. at 698.
134. Id. at 686-87.
135. Id. at 704. Maine law punished as murder the unlawful killing of a human
being with "malice aforethought." Id. at 686 n.3 (citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17,
§ 2651 (West 1964)). Thus, the defendant essentially was forced to offer proof to re-
duce a charge of intentional homicide to manslaughter, running contrary to the notion
that the burden of proof lies with the prosecution. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 689 n.9,
700-01; see also Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 30, at 1338.
136. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975).
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The Mullaney reading of Winship was altered, however, in Patterson
v. New York.137 The Court in Patterson analyzed a New York statute
that was similar to Maine's in Mullaney. The Patterson Court, how-
ever, reached the opposite result, holding that a conviction under New
York law that placed the burden on the defendant to prove emotional
disturbance was constitutional. 38
Thus, Patterson allows legislatures to define the elements of a crime
and dictate what the prosecution must prove, even if it strains at con-
stitutional standards. Unlike Mullaney's holding, which functionally
considered whether the fact in question truly seemed to be an element
of the offense regardless of what the legislature attempted to label it,
the Patterson approach was satisfied to defer to the legislature. Under
Patterson, the prosecution only has to prove the elements of the crimi-
nal offense, as defined by the legislature.
Courts must not, however, stand by and permit legislative relabeling
to emasculate the Gaudin holding. First, a constitutional concern is
present. Legislatures are empowered to draft statutes and determine
the elements of crimes,'139 but once a statute is drafted, the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment protections are triggered when a defendant is pros-
ecuted. Just as a legislature cannot bypass the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment protections by drafting a criminal statute that expressly
eliminated the defendant's right to a jury trial,140 a legislature may not
137. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
138. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 211, 215-16. The Court's distinction has been character-
ized as relatively technical. Maine's law specified malice as an essential element of
murder, with malice denoting both mens rea and the absence of sudden heat of pas-
sion. Because malice and heat of passion were connected, if the state forced the de-
fendant to prove heat of passion, it was implicitly relieving the state of its burden to
prove malice. In Patterson, however, the statute did not contain the term "malice,"
and because the law did not formally identify the absence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance in its definition of murder, Winship was inapposite. See Jeffries & Stephan,
supra note 30, at 1342.
The author of Mullaney, Justice Powell, dissented in Patterson, stating:
But a substantial difference in punishment alone is not enough. It also must
be shown that in the Anglo-American legal tradition the factor in question
historically has held that level of importance. If either branch of the test is
not met, then the legislature retains its traditional authority over matters of
proof....
The WinshiplMullaney test identifies those factors of such importance, his-
torically, in determining punishment and stigma that the Constitution for-
bids shifting to the defendant the burden of persuasion when such a factor is
at issue. Winship and Mullaney specify only the procedure that is required
when a State elects to use such a factor as part of its substantive criminal law.
They do not say that the State must elect to use it.
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 226-28.
139. See U.S. Const. art. I. Although the Constitution speaks directly to Congress,
its mandate most likely extends to state legislatures by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-704.
140. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (holding that right
to jury trial also applies to state proceedings). The right to trial by jury only applies to
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label materiality as a question of law, for it would have a substantially
similar effect.
A less direct constitutional concern is that permitting legislatures
not only to eliminate an element, but to reserve it for consideration by
the court, would invite harmful results. As Mullaney and Patterson
indicate, allowing legislatures to tinker with statutes and remove what
are normally considered elements of a crime can lead to some uncom-
fortable results. The discomfort stems from the perception that a leg-
islature is able to shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
criminal defendant by forcing the defendant to prove as an "affirma-
tive defense" something that looks very much like what the prosecu-
tion should be required to prove as an "element." While the Supreme
Court has held it to be constitutional, legislative tinkering with stat-
utes invokes the concern that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protec-
tions are being circumvented. 141 To allow legislatures to go even
further and tinker with how elements are labeled and handled by
courts, however, invites constitutional disaster.142
If a legislature is faced with the option of eliminating the element
entirely or incorporating the element, thereby complying with consti-
tutional constraints, the system's built-in protections will work effec-
tively. Various safeguards underlie the legislative process, leading
society to be confident that nothing irrational will emanate from our
legislature. 143 In the false statement context, legislatures would be un-
serious crimes, however, and although the right does not apply to petty offenses, the
penalty in Duncan, two years in prison, was considered by the Court to be a serious
crime. Id. at 159-62.
141. Commentators have wrestled with the two opinions, some considering the
MullaneylPatterson decisions as requiring a purely procedural reading of Winship. See
Underwood, supra note 30, at 1305, 1317-20. Others feel substantive justice can be
adequately protected through other means, such as societal and historical norms as to
what elements a crime should contain, see Patterson, 432 U.S. at 226-27 (Powell, J.,
dissenting), or by requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements neces-
sary to impose the punishment proposed. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 30, at
1365.
142. Thus, while we might allow the system to be potentially weakened in a given
respect, we cannot allow the system to be doubly weakened. By analogy, juries may
contain as few as six members, see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,239 (1978) (hold-
ing that six is the absolute minimum size of a jury for the defendant to be afforded
constitutional protection); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970) (holding a
12-member jury is not constitutionally required), or nommanimous jury verdicts may
be acceptable, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406, 411 (1972) (holding that
nonunanimous verdicts may be constitutional). It is impermissible, however, to simul-
taneously allow nonmanimous jury verdicts with juries comprised of six members.
See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979) (holding conviction by a
nonunanimous six-member jury deprives defendant of his constitutional right to trial
by jury).
143. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 985-86 (1991) ("Neither Con-
gress nor any state legislature has ever set out with the objective of crafting a penalty
that is 'disproportionate'. ... This is not to say that there are no absolutes; one canimagine extreme examples that no rational person, in no time or place, could accept.
But for the same reason these examples are easy to decide, they are certain never to
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likely to react to Gaudin by drafting statutes without a materiality re-
quirement at all. The legislature is unlikely to take this step because
such a statute would give the government the power to prosecute
meaningless or trivial lies, in contravention of accepted societal
norms.'" Also, such a practice would clog court dockets with trivial
matters, wasting taxpayer money.
A general faith in the legislature, however, cannot comprise the sys-
tem's only safeguard. Legislatures that wish to include materiality as
an element of a false statement prosecution must accept the Supreme
Court's characterization of materiality as a mixed question of law and
fact. To allow the legislature to label elements as questions of law for
the court will impermissibly bypass the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
protections by linguistic sleight of hand.14 5
As Justice Scalia noted in Gaudin, mixed questions of law and fact
are to be determined by juries.'46 For our jury system and the protec-
tions it affords to have continued integrity, 47 these questions must
occur.") There are crimes without elements of intent, such as statutory rape, and even
absent what is an essential element to virtually all other crimes, the result is accepted
by society and viewed as just.
144. See cases cited supra note 83 (discussing rationale for materiality
requirement).
145. Generally, it is not feared that legislatures will go too far, because at some
point society will not tolerate it. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. How-
ever, this general faith in the democratic system should come with reservations. Even
adopting Justice Scalia's view in Harmelin, situations may arise where society as a
whole becomes concerned enough about a particular problem to endorse legislative
action that sacrifices significant constitutional rights. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214,219 (1944) (upholding the conviction of a Japanese American for
remaining in San Leandro, California, thereby violating Civilian Exclusion Order No.
34, which ordered all persons of Japanese ancestry to be excluded from that "military
area"). Americans in general may have supported the idea that, due to panic after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese Americans should be detained in internment camps.
Majority acceptance aside, however, these Japanese American citizens had their con-
stitutional rights violated. While the judiciary may not be able to safeguard all rights,
because the scope of those rights may inherently be linked to societal norms at a given
time, the point remains that reliance on the legislature and society to do "the right
thing" is an imperfect safeguard on constitutional protection. That is one of the rea-
sons for having an appointed, nonrepresentative federal judiciary that need not con-
cern itself with the electorate's whims when making decisions.
146. See United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2314 (1995) (citing J. Thayer, A
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, 194, 249-50 (1898)).
147. Highlighting the importance of juries to our criminal system, Justice Clark in
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), discussed how the right to a jury trial is embedded
in our judicial system:
England, from whom the Western World has largely taken its concepts of
individual liberty and of the dignity and worth of every man, has bequeathed
to us safeguards for their preservation, the most priceless of which is that of
trial by jury. This right has become as much American as it was once the
most English. Although this Court has said that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not demand the use of jury trials in a State's criminal procedure, every
State has constitutionally provided trial by jury. In essence, the right to ajury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impar-
tial, "indifferent" jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing vio-
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continue to go to juries, regardless of legislative attempts at contrary
results.
CONCLUSION
For a short, unheralded decision, Gaudin was a case of great signifi-
cance. The Court's holding that materiality in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 prose-
cutions must be determined by the jury ran counter not only to almost
every circuit's precedent regarding § 1001, but also contrary to courts'
handling of the materiality determination in other false statement con-
texts. The Supreme Court based its holding in Gaudin on the funda-
mental significance of the constitutional guarantees that criminal
defendants will receive due process and a jury trial, as provided for in
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Consequently, the Gaudin holding
cannot be limited to its factual context, but must be extended to other
false statement statutes with similar materiality requirements.
The implications of the Supreme Court's holding in Gaudin extend
far beyond false statement prosecutions, however, and impact mixed
questions of law and fact generally. Because of the importance of a
criminal defendant's right to trial by jury, whenever legal issues are
inextricably entangled with factual determinations, the entire issue
must be submitted to the jury. Legislatures may not circumvent this
constitutional guarantee by means of an arbitrary characterization of
an element as merely legal, requiring only a determination by a court.
The Court's holding in Gaudin and the protections it safeguards ex-
tend not only to judicial interpretations, but also to legislative med-
dling that otherwise would circumvent a court's protective role.
lates even the minimal standards of due process.... In the ultimate analysis,
only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or his life.
I& at 721-22 (citations omitted).
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